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Appeals to Experience in Hobbes’s Science of Politics 
Tom Sorell 
 
 
Hobbes was not an experimental philosopher. He had hostile exchanges with Boyle 
over the postulation of the ‘spring’ of air (Hobbes 1985) and he was critical of the 
experimental set-up that was supposed to support that postulation, as well the probity 
of its immediate audience. More generally, and contrary to the practice of many 
experimental philosophers, he tended to define natural philosophy as if it were in 
some sort of tension with natural history.1 According to chapter nine of Leviathan,2 
histories, including natural histories, are registers of situations seen and remembered 
(Hobbes 1991: 60). Sense and memory, however, are particular, piecemeal, fleeting 
and fallible. By contrast, natural philosophy or science is universal in scope, 
penetrating, and, in principle, capable of reaching true and indisputable conclusions. 
Sense and memory provide some of the raw material of science – the appearances 
bodies present – but the process and conclusions of science are the product of reason 
(Hobbes 1991: 60), and depend on capacities for naming things, combining names 
into propositions, and constructing chains of deduction (Sorell 1986: 37). In Hobbes 
the terms ‘science’ and ‘reason’ are honorific; ‘sense’ and ‘memory’ are not. Neither 
is ‘history’, and he is explicit in his distrust of natural histories (Hobbes 1985: 351). 
In short, Hobbes condescends not only to experiment but to experience. 
 
This paper considers an unusual break from that condescension – in Hobbes’s civil 
philosophy. Although he claims for his own formulation of civil philosophy a kind of 
definitiveness and certainty that only geometry has among the sciences, and although 
both geometry and civil philosophy are supposed to be the products of reason, the 
necessity of establishing and submitting to the commonwealth is open to a certain sort 
of confirmation from experience. This is not because Hobbes concedes cognitive 
authority to sense and memory after all, but because civil philosophy has a rhetorical 
purpose that a certain kind of appeal to experience helps to achieve. 
 
 
 2 
I 
 
According to chapter nine of Leviathan, science is to be assigned higher value than 
mere ‘knowledge’ (that which is required in a witness), and science or philosophy is 
to be distinguished from history. Knowledge is of discrete facts; science reveals what 
the facts depend on. In natural science the relations of dependence revealed are 
between particular facts known and general truths couched in universal names. 
Natural histories are pre-scientific compendia of knowledge: they systematically 
register facts, but these supply only the raw material of natural science – its 
explananda.3 Explanations of observed facts result from reasoning to efficient causes 
captured in a highly general vocabulary for describing bodies and motions. Or at least 
this is how natural philosophy or science relates to history.  
 
He also recognized sciences for constructing or making things – plane and solid 
figures in the case of geometry, and commonwealths in the case of politics. The 
sciences of artificial bodies do not start with observed properties and infer their 
causes: they start with a specification of a finished product and say how things with 
those properties can be generated at will – by the methods of geometrical construction 
in one case, and, in the other case, by people contracting together in a special way. A 
scientific politics can be informed by civil histories – narratives of the rise and fall of 
commonwealths in the past – but it doesn’t depend on them for its truth. What it 
depends upon is an analysis of human nature, consisting of non-historical truths about 
human sense, motivation and language, and how they contribute to potential human 
conflict under certain general and plausible assumptions. In this sense a science of 
politics is independent of history.  
 
Hobbes has two ways of describing how the science of politics works. On the one 
hand, he associates it with a method of linguistic analysis for deciding whether any 
contemplated course of action would be just or unjust for a citizen to carry out. The 
other – more evidently connected to the description of civil science as a theory about 
the generation of a certain kind of body – consists of a thought experiment about the 
abolition of coercive political authority. This uses the science of human nature and 
what Hobbes supposes is a shared, worldly common sense about human behaviour, to 
arrive at the conclusion that people would be at war if released from subjection to 
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government. The drawbacks of war, which Hobbes enumerates, are so great as to give 
people good reasons for creating coercive political authority (a commonwealth or 
body politic) where it does not exist, or obeying it if it does exist locally. 
 
Civil philosophy is described in the first way in chapter six, section seven, of De 
corpore:4 
 
For if a question be propounded, as whether such an action be just or unjust; if 
the unjust be resolved into fact against law and that law into the command of 
him or them that have coercive power; and that power be derived from the 
wills of men that constitute that power, to the end they may live in peace, they 
may at last come to this, that the appetites of men and the passions of their 
minds are such that, unless they be restrained by some power, they will always 
be making war upon one another; which may be known to be so by any man’s 
experience, that will but examine his own mind. And therefore, he may 
proceed, by compounding, to the determination of the justice or injustice of 
any propounded action (Hobbes 1845: Vol I: 74) 
 
The second kind of approach is announced in the preface to the Readers of De cive 
(Hobbes 1998): 
 
As far as my Method is concerned, I decided that the conventional structure of 
rhetorical discourse, though clear, would not suffice by itself. Rather, I should 
begin with the matter of which a commonwealth is made and go on to how it 
comes into being and the form it takes, and to the first origin of justice. For a 
thing is best known from its constituents. As in an automatic Clock or other 
fairly complex device, one cannot get to know the function of each part and 
wheel unless one takes it apart, and examines separately the material, shape and 
motion of the parts, so in investigating the right of commonwealth and the 
duties of citizens, there is a need, not indeed to take the commonwealth apart, 
but to view it as taken apart, i.e. to understand correctly what human nature is 
like, and in what features it is suitable and in what unsuitable to construct a 
commonwealth, and how men who want to grow together, should be connected 
(Hobbes 1998: 10) 
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These passages need to be taken together with textual evidence of a view of 
philosophy or science in Hobbes that associates it with reason to the exclusion of 
experience, and textual evidence that Hobbes is impatient with objections from 
experience to both the thought experiment of taking apart the commonwealth and his 
conclusion that the coercive power in the commonwealth has to be unlimited. 
 
For the relevant view of philosophy one need look no further than chapter one, section 
two of De corpore, where philosophy or science is defined: 
 
Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire  
by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or 
generation: And again, of such causes and generations as may be from 
knowing first their effects. 
 For the better understanding of which definition, we must consider, 
first, that although Sense and Memory of things, which are common to man 
and all living creatures, be knowledge, yet because they are given us 
immediately by nature, and not gotten by ratiocination, they are not 
philosophy. 
 Secondly, seeing Experience is nothing but memory; and Prudence, or 
prospect into the future time, nothing but expectation of such things as we 
have already had experience of, Prudence also is not to be esteemed 
philosophy (Hobbes 1845: Vol I: 10). 
 
For evidence of impatience with objections from experience to conclusions reached in 
civil philosophy, we can turn to the end of chapter twenty of Leviathan. Here Hobbes 
has just reached the conclusion that ‘the Sovereign Power, whether placed in One 
Man…, or in an Assembly of men,… is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to 
make it’ (Hobbes 1991: 144). In other words, according to Hobbes, people who 
contract together for protection from one another and from external conquest agree to 
as great a protective power as possible, that is, a power not limited by any other local 
power. He then considers what might be said against this conclusion: 
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The greatest objection, is that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and when, 
such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged… But howsoever, an 
argument from the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and 
with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Commonweaths, and 
suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is 
invalid… The skill of making, and maintaining Commonwealths, consisteth in 
certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on 
Practise onely (Hobbes 1991: 145). 
 
By ‘practise’ he means, action recorded by civil histories. Since philosophy as 
Hobbes defines it is independent of history, and since, in particular, he explicitly 
denies that civil philosophy is to be drawn from the political practices of the past, 
there is something jarring about appeals to experience in Hobbes’s own statement of 
his civil philosophy.  
 
But apparently he does appeal to experience. For example, in the passage already 
cited from De Corpore, chapter six, section seven, in which he describes how by 
analytically connecting ‘just’, ‘fact against ‘law,’ ‘command of someone who has 
sovereign power,’ and so on, one 
 
may at last come to this, that the appetites of men and the passions of their 
minds are such that, unless they be restrained by some power, they will always 
be making war upon one another (Hobbes 1845: Vol I: 74). 
 
Hobbes immediately adds, 
 
which may be known to be so by any man’s experience, that will but examine 
his own mind (Hobbes 1845: Vol I: 74). 
 
Is he not here appealing to experience, contrary to what scientific reasoning is 
supposed to allow? Not exactly. There is a chain of reasoning in his political writings 
leading to the conclusion that people are warlike, and this conclusion is supposedly 
confirmed by introspective experience. Introspective experience is not required to 
reach the conclusion. In the same way, there is a proof in plane geometry leading to 
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the conclusion that in triangles with equal sides the angles opposite those sides are 
equal: seeing a diagram of an isosceles triangle might make the conclusion of that 
proof independently plausible, but it is not a contribution to the relevant proof.  
 
As we shall see, however, there are more substantial appeals to experience in his 
political writings. Should these be regarded as embarrassing departures from his 
official philosophy of science? I shall suggest that they reflect Hobbes’s attempt to 
fuse civil philosophy with rhetoric. He wants a civil philosophy that shows the 
generation of a body politic and simultaneously teaches subjects their duties. This 
involves an imaginative dissolution of the body politic, i.e. an imaginative dissolution 
of a system of authority and subjection, intended to reveal a purpose for a body politic 
that citizens, including readers, could endorse. But for this purpose to win 
endorsement people have to acquire possibly painful self-knowledge: that human 
beings are naturally warlike. What is more, the fact of human bellicosity has to be 
entered into imaginatively, that is, by responding passionately to the war of all against 
all that the state would degenerate into if political authority disappeared. 
 
Hobbes’s civil philosophy is an attempt to activate that self-knowledge through 
argument to a frightening conclusion. If this rhetorical strategy works, the habitual 
and grudging submission of his readers to political authority changes into consciously 
willing submission through the conception of the dissolution of authority. 
 
 
II 
 
 
Hobbes wrote three political treatises. The earliest, The Elements of Law, was written 
in 1640 and circulated in manuscript among royalists in Parliament. It was not 
published whole in Hobbes’s lifetime, and its two parts—one on human nature and 
the other on the body politic – were eventually printed as separate books. A proper 
edition was prepared at the end of the 19th century by Ferdinand Tonnies (Hobbes 
1994). It is striking that the Epistle Dedicatory to the work already shows that Hobbes 
is conscious of the methodological problems associated with a scientific politics. 
Science is supposed to be free from dispute; politics is inevitably controversial. So a 
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scientific politics is particularly ambitious. It seeks ‘to reduce this doctrine [of justice 
and policy] to the rules and infallibility of reason, and the only way of doing so is 
‘first, to put such principles down for a foundation, as passion not mistrusting may not 
seek to displace’. This could be the motto of all three of Hobbes’s forays into civil 
science. In each treatise he experiments with different rhetorics for reconciling reason 
with the passion-stirring subject matter of politics.  
 
The format Hobbes chooses in the Elements of Law is that of the systematic treatise. 
Human nature is analysed into different capacities; certain exercises of those 
capacities are identified as ingredients of war; and then rules are adduced for 
counteracting those behaviours. It is unclear how the content of this treatise was 
appropriated by the royalist parliamentarians whom it was intended to help in debates. 
 
The second of the three treatises appeared after Hobbes fled England for Paris in 
1640, before the outbreak of the civil war. A small number of copies of De cive first 
appeared in 1642 and a second edition with amendments and replies to criticisms was 
issued in 1647. Although ostensibly addressed to anyone who wanted to know the 
rules of citizenship, its intended audience was probably a section of the Continental 
scientific community associated with the new “mechanical philosophy” and opposed 
to the scholastics. For this audience the method of the work and the novelty of its 
approach to politics were emphasized. Mersenne and Descartes were among the early 
readers of the work. De cive was intended to complete a trilogy called The Elements 
of Philosophy, the first two volumes of which – on body and on man – were largely 
unwritten in 1642. De cive has a claim to give the preferred scientific statement of his 
politics, and it is the book Hobbes has in mind when he claims, in the Epistle 
Dedicatory to De corpore, to have invented civil science.  
 
Leviathan, the last of the three full-scale presentations of Hobbes’s politics, innovates 
significantly on De cive in its Parts One and Two, while also discussing at length, in 
Parts Three and Four, the preferred relation between political and ecclesiastical 
authority. Although it is the most intensely studied of Hobbes’s political treatises, its 
intended audience is not easy to identify. There are indications both in the text and in 
Hobbes’s act of presenting a copy of the book to Charles II, that it was intended to be 
used as a sort of guide to kingship.5 
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As our interest is in the relation of Hobbes’s civil science to his philosophy of 
science, there are reasons to emphasize De cive, which is the most self-consciously 
scientific of the three treatises. But as Hobbes was interested from the first in the 
problems of establishing definitive conclusions in as controversial an area as politics, 
The Elements of Law is also relevant. And, as De cive was not Hobbes’s final attempt 
at persuasive civil science, but was, on the contrary, overshadowed by the rhetorical 
tour de force one finds in Leviathan, all three works need to be taken into account. 
 
What are the components of ‘civil philosophy’, according to the three works? I 
suggest at least the following, in typical order of presentation: 
 
1. A taxonomy of human passions 
2. Description of state of nature as a condition of natural equality with each 
being the rightful judge of what to do for his own survival and prosperity (the 
right of nature) 
3. Equation of state of nature with state of war 
4. Identification of the passionate ingredients in war (vain glory, ‘diffidence’) 
5. Identification of passions inclining people to peace (fear and hope) 
6. Statement of precepts guiding the will in making peace (laws of nature 
arranged in a particular order) 
7. Statement of crucial law of nature – the second – requiring people to lay down 
the right of nature if everyone else does 
8. Making peace conceptualized as mutual pact among a majority of co-located 
people to submit to a third party, who becomes sovereign 
9. Theory of Rights of Sovereign 
10. Submission conceptualized as unquestioning obedience to law of sovereign  
11. Norms for law-making, enforcement 
 
Material corresponding to each of these eleven elements is to be found in all three 
political treatises except De cive. De cive lacks (1), that material being assigned, in 
the context of Hobbes’s trilogy, to De cive’s prequel, namely De homine. Hobbes 
makes the striking claim, however, that De cive is in a certain sense quite complete on 
its own: 
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And so it has come about that the part [of the trilogy] that was last in order has 
come out first; especially as I saw that it did not need the preceding parts, 
since it rests upon its own principles known by reason (Hobbes 1998: 13).  
 
He is saying, in effect, that element (2) of the civil philosophy needs no introduction. 
It needs no introduction because – as we have already seen him insist – the makings 
in human nature of war are somehow intimated to us anyway – in experience.  
 
De cive, then, is where we might look first for the sort of load-bearing appeal to 
experience in civil philosophy that Hobbes’s own philosophy of science seems to 
make illicit. A first relevant passage is the following, from the Preface to the Readers: 
 
Following such a Method [of deriving duties of subjects and rights of 
sovereigns from human nature], I put in first place, as a Principle, well known 
to all men by experience, and which everyone admits, that man’s natural 
Disposition is such, that if they are not restrained by fear of a common power, 
they will distrust and fear each other, and every man may, and necessarily 
will, look out for himself from his own resources (Hobbes 1998: 10). 
 
This is an announcement of what goes on in chapter 1. There Hobbes takes issue with 
the Aristotelian part-definition of man as a political animal.6 Man is not a political 
animal in the sense of being naturally sociable or seeking friendly association. Rather,  
 
Men’s purpose in seeking each other’s company may be inferred from that 
which they do once they meet. If they meet to do business, everyone is 
looking for profit, not friendship. If the reason is public affairs, a kind of 
political relationship develops, which holds more mutual fear than love; it is 
sometimes the occasion of faction, but never of good-will. If they meet for 
entertainment or fun, everyone usually takes most pleasure in the kind of 
amusing incident… from which he may come away with a better of idea of 
himself in comparison with some else’s embarrassment or weakness… 
[W]hat they primarily enjoy is their own glory and not society (Hobbes 1998: 
22). 
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After giving many instances of back-biting and self-aggrandizing human behaviour 
that he expects his readers to agree are commonplace, Hobbes concludes,  
 
It is true that the advantages of this life can be increased with other people’s 
help. But this is much more effectively achieved by Dominion over others 
than by their help. Hence no one should doubt that, in the absence of fear, men 
would be more avidly attracted to domination than to society (Hobbes 1998: 
24). 
 
The conclusion that human beings are by nature anti-social, then, is supported solely 
by a series of worldly generalizations from experience. This means that Chapter One 
of De cive contains a substantial, not merely an ornamental, appeal to experience. 
 
What is more, this appeal to experience supports an unflattering conclusion about 
human beings, a conclusion that human beings, including readers of De cive, would 
resist. He explicitly anticipates the resistance:  
 
You will object perhaps that some deny [that in the absence of fear of a 
coercive power, people will distrust and fear each other]. That is so; many do 
deny it. Surely then I am contradicting myself, saying both that they admit it 
and that they deny it. No, I am not contradicting myself. They are, however, 
because they admit by their actions what they deny in their words… even 
within commonwealths, where there are laws and penalties against 
wrongdoers, individual citizens do not travel without a weapon to defend 
themselves or go to bed without barring their doors… Can men express their 
universal distrust of one another more openly? All commonwealths and 
individuals behave in this way, and thus admit their fear and distrust of one 
another (Hobbes 1998: 10-11). 
. 
We can distinguish between two senses of ‘everyone admits’ in ‘everyone admits that 
human beings distrust and fear one another’: 
 
(A) Everyone judges and says that human beings distrust and fear one another 
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and  
(B) Whatever they say, everyone acts as if they distrust and fear one 
another—they ride armed; they lock their chests at home even against their 
own family members 
 
In sense (B) everyone’s admitting something is compatible with a self-deceiving 
illusion or with slavish deference to Aristotelian formulae. The reason Hobbes is 
consistent when he says that people both admit and don’t admit to fearing and 
distrusting everyone else, is that not admitting in sense (A) is compatible with 
admitting in sense (B). But Hobbes’s pointing out what we admit in sense (B) is 
jarring, because we like to think that we are charitable and trusting. 
 
To be persuasive in the face the possibility of collective self-deception Hobbes needs 
to defuse the implication that universal mistrust and fear are attitudes that only moral 
defectives extend to one another. He does defuse this implication. He says that people 
cannot be blamed for distrusting and fearing those who would dominate them in the 
state of nature, and those who would dominate in the state of nature cannot be blamed 
either—if they honestly judge that there is no way other than by domination of 
securing their own interests, their own interests in survival included. In practice the 
vainglorious want everything and dominate for that reason, while those who want no 
more than an equal share, try to dominate in an effort to pre-empt the domination of 
the vainglorious (Hobbes 1998: Ch.1, section 4). 
 
III 
 
Between De cive and Leviathan Hobbes departed from the form of argument we have 
just been reviewing. He argues from the scientific theory of human nature – not 
anecdotal data about supposedly typical human behaviour – to the inevitability of war. 
That is, he argues from the variety of ‘manners’, natural equality, scarcity and 
modestly distributed vainglory, to the inevitability of people exercising the right of 
nature violently. And he makes an appeal to a different sort of experience to confirm 
the inevitability of war. This appeal sits better with claiming that his political 
philosophy is based on reason. For it is a consequence of his scientific theory of 
human nature that introspective experience has some constant and some variable 
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features, and his argument confirms the argument for the inevitability of war with 
features of each reader’s introspective experience that are constant. 
 
The bearing of introspective experience on the reception of Hobbes’ political doctrine 
is brought up in the Introduction to Leviathan. Hobbes associates it with a saying to 
the effect that wisdom is a matter of reading men, not books.  
 
Nosce teipsum, Read thyself: which was not meant… to countenance the 
barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men 
of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour toward their betters; But to teach us that 
for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, 
and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth 
what he doth, when does think, opine, reason, hope, feare &c, and upon what 
grounds; he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts, and Passions 
of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, 
which are the same in all men…; not the similitude of the objects of the 
Passions… (Hobbes 1991: 10). 
 
He goes on to say how a king reading Leviathan is supposed to combine the text with 
a special kind of self-reading: 
 
He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that 
particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be harder to do, harder than to 
learn any Language or Science; yet when I shall have set down my own 
reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left to another will be onely to 
consider, if he does not find the same in himself, for this kind of doctrine 
admitteth no other Demonstration (Hobbes 1991: 11). 
 
Hobbes is describing Leviathan as a kind of systematic exposition of his own reading 
of mankind, which a sovereign reader of his book has only to check introspectively.  
 
There are a number of difficulties with this passage. For one thing, it seems to conflict 
with what he says in Chapter 30, on the duties of a sovereign. The message of that 
chapter is in part that ‘he who is to govern a whole nation’ must read in himself a 
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whole People, that is, those who submit to him. He must identify with the interests of 
those who submit – attend to the Good of the People (Hobbes 1991: 239) rather than 
his own interests as an individual. But a People is not Mankind. 
 
Cannot Hobbes have it both ways: insist on the need for the sovereign to identify with 
the good of a People and insist on the need for a sovereign to acquire systematic 
knowledge of human nature? I think there is no inconsistency here. It is true that in 
Leviathan Hobbes breaks methodologically from De cive by finding a use for 
introspection rather than a worldly third-person knowledge of human behaviour. The 
opening chapter of De cive works if readers find recognizable or true-to-life the back-
biting, glory-seeking and pursuit of profit that Hobbes describes there. But 
 
And though by men’s actions wee do discover their designe sometimes; yet to 
do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all 
circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher 
without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or too 
much diffidence, as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man… (Hobbes 
1991: 10) 
 
In other words, we are unlikely to read others accurately unless we consider their 
behavior from other perspectives – including by comparison with first-person 
perspectives on our own behavior and reflection on counterfactual situations. If we 
fail to do this, our reading is likely to be unduly skewed by what we are like. 
 
The limitations of third-person readings of human behavior do not end there. To 
return to the back-biting and glory-seeking described in chapter 1 of De cive, readers 
can find those things recognizable without believing that they themselves are driven 
by aggression or self-aggrandisement. Suppose I read Hobbes’s description of the 
vainglorious and recoil, thinking that I am not like that, but suppose that this is self-
deception, and I am in fact quite like that. Suppose it is also self-deception when I 
cast myself in the role of the unassuming person drawn into war by the need to pre-
empt the attack of the vainglorious. That is my way of applying Hobbes’s argument to 
myself without admitting that I am vainglorious. I avoid the self-examination that 
would reveal to me that I am activated by the desire for glory. Hobbes’s conclusion – 
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that I have to avoid war – is nevertheless accessible to me. Despite my self-
deceivingly believing that my involvement in war would only be forced upon me by 
the depredations of the vainglorious, I can see that there are a variety of passionate 
vectors leading to war.  
 
Why is any more needed? Why do I need to identify the passions of the unassuming 
in myself or indeed the passions of any other character-type in myself? In other 
words, why is self-reading supposed to be necessary in my learning the lesson that 
war is latent in human nature? Why can’t I leave open the question of which passions 
I have and simply believe that I am likely to have some that in combination with 
vainglory in other people will give me a reason for aggression? Leviathan tells me 
that everyone feels passions that can lead to war, even if everyone does not feel the 
same passions, or the same passions for the same things: the reason is that different 
combinations of a great variety of human passions can lead to war when people with 
different psychological constitutions interact. And it is the irresistibility of the 
conclusion that there is a latent war of all against all, not a latent war of most against 
most or a war of most against some that Hobbes has to reach. Why must this 
conclusion be reached with introspective confirmation?  
 
Hobbes has a simple answer if we assume that first-personal psychological 
confirmation is not to accompany a reader’s reception of the general argument for 
war but only the reception of descriptions of behavior that unembarrassingly confirm 
everyone’s distrust of other human beings. In chapter 13 of Leviathan he writes,  
 
It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things; that 
Nature should thus dissociate, and render man apt to invade, and destroy one 
another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the 
Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him 
therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and 
seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when 
even in his house he locks his chests. Does he not there  
As much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of 
us accuses man’s nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in 
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themselves no Sin. No more are Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till 
they know a Law that forbids them… (Hobbes 1991: 89). 
 
He is inviting his readers to summon up the memory of passions they feel when they 
take customary (and therefore blameless and unembarrassing) precautions against 
robbery and pilfering. Honest recall is supposed to be enough to satisfy the 
requirements of reading oneself. Hobbes even disarms the inclination to criticize 
oneself for distrust. This, then, is the painless operation of the method of reading 
oneself.  
 
In the passage just quoted actual experience is invoked. But it is at least arguable that 
the method of reading oneself can also be applied through imagination. This is what 
happens when Hobbes conjures up for readers who have never known the war of all 
against all, what it would be like: 
 
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no navigation nor use of 
the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no 
Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no 
knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; 
no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent 
death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short (Hobbes 
1991: 89). 
 
A reader who enters imaginatively into this extremely famous passage will 
presumably feel some of the passions elicited by a disruption of the supply of 
comfort-creating goods, not to mention fear of violent death. And this is a way not 
only of reading oneself so as to confirm Hobbes’s inference, but of becoming 
motivated to avoid war. This is more than following the argument without becoming 
offended by its depiction of human nature. It is a way of becoming inclined or 
disposed to find out how to avoid war and to take the necessary steps. In this way the 
science of human nature is going to produce action and not only understanding. Or, in 
other words, Hobbes’s theory of the appropriate reception of his inference from the 
passions to war shows that his civil science is a fusion of reasoning with rhetorical 
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power, or the power to elicit appropriate action. Hobbes’ civil science is not just 
supposed to reach its conclusions soundly but is supposed to reach practical 
conclusions. 
 
 
IV 
 
Before making clearer how the appeal to experience in Leviathan differs from the 
appeal to experience in his other political writings, I have to address a problem in 
Hobbes’s use of what I just called the extremely famous passage, namely that he does 
not expect his readers to recognize from experience the kind of war that means the 
end of all good things and the concentration of bad things. Apart from those early 
readers of Leviathan who would have experienced the English civil war,7 Hobbes 
does not take it for granted that his audience will accept his picture of the 
inconveniences of war. On the contrary, he immediately entertains the objection that 
‘there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this’ (Hobbes 1991: 89). If 
correct, this objection would show that Hobbes was appealing not to experience in 
describing the inconveniences of war, but to a sort of pure imaginative invention. But 
Hobbes denies this, citing two historical phenomena to show that the war of all 
against all has existed. 
 
The first embodiment of all-out war that Hobbes cites is the life of American native 
people in the 17th century. These people, he claims, lack all the arts and sciences and 
are social, economic and technological primitives, lacking in addition all large-scale 
government. The second contemporary example that Hobbes cites is international war 
over the ages. Nations are in as much of a condition of non-government as native 
American Indians are, or at least as families of them are. The problem with this 
example is that it is compatible with the local or domestic absence of conflict, as well 
as the absence of its characteristic miseries. In other words, though it is a real and 
contemporary example of the war of all against all, it does not inspire fear. A parallel 
problem afflicts the war of all against all among native North Americans. Although 
that example too is of actual contemporary life, it is of deeply alien and distant human 
life, unlikely to register with English readers as reasons for them to submit. This 
leaves only recent experience of domestic civil war as an appropriate thing to appeal 
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to. It is plausible to claim that this experience would both have seemed vivid and 
appropriately fearful to contemporary readers. 
 
I now turn to the distinctiveness of the appeal to experience in Leviathan. Not 
everything about it is new. For example, the reminder to readers that they lock chests 
and ride armed is not. It is in De cive. The 1647 edition adds to the anecdotal 
description of anti-social behaviour in chapter 1 a note about the sense in which 
mutual fear is at the source of human social arrangements. The first readers of De cive 
objected that societies were not built on fear: 
 
The objectors believe, I think, that fearing is nothing but being actually 
frightened. But I mean by that word any anticipation of future evil. In my 
view, not only flight, but also distrust, suspicion, precaution and provision 
against fear are all characteristic of men who are afraid. On going to bed, men 
lock their doors; when going on a journey they arm themselves because they 
are afraid of robbers. Countries guard their frontiers with fortresses, their cities 
with walls, through fear of neighbouring countries (Hobbes 1998: 25). 
 
This directly anticipates the appeal to experience that confirms the inference from the 
passions in Leviathan. 
 
What is new in Leviathan is the fear-inducing description of all-out war and the 
identification and exploitation of the passions of hope and fear for motivating people 
to pursue or keep the peace. Neither of the earlier treatises employs these devices. De 
cive acknowledges the operation of fear in submission to government, but it does not 
activate that fear in the justification of submission. Nor does it have devices for taking 
the sting out of the unflattering descriptions of human behaviour that are used to win 
the admission of human unsociableness. People who do not recognize, or refuse to 
recognize, what is unsociable or aggressive in themselves, will not necessarily be 
persuaded that government is the answer to the threat of violence emanating from a 
communal life that includes them. 
 
What about Hobbes’s point that people’s defensive behaviour belies their 
protestations of their own and other people’s peaceableness? This claim is actually 
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disputable. For the fact that many people lock their doors and chests and ride armed 
does not mean that they distrust all human beings or that they believe mankind has 
violent and ruthlessly acquisitive tendencies. Instead, using locks and riding armed 
may express belief in the existence of an untrustworthy but so far unidentified local 
minority. In other words, I may believe that only a few others around me mean to rob 
me, but not knowing who or where they are, I place locks on my goods that keep 
everyone out – people I trust as well as strangers. Indiscriminate prevention of 
robbery does not, however, express the view that everyone around me, let alone 
everyone full stop, is out to rob me.  
 
Hobbes needs a general conclusion – all human beings living together are naturally in 
conflict – that can explain and be confirmed by experience, and that can motivate 
people to make or keep the peace. The general conclusion cannot be established by 
experience, for experience ‘concludeth nothing universally’: it needs to be established 
by an argument couched in general propositions – a piece of science. De cive provides 
an indirect argument, by providing counter-examples to the Aristotelian dictum that 
human beings are sociable, that they are political animals. But it leaves between the 
lines the costs of conflict and the fact that the conflict has no natural limits. So De 
cive does not necessarily equip itself to persuade otherwise rebellious readers why 
they should keep the peace. It runs the risk of failure to persuade even though the task 
of persuasion is given top billing in the Preface to the Readers (Hobbes 1998: 13). 
 
Leviathan supplies the general conclusion, the general reasoning leading to it, and the 
motivating or passion-stirring picture of the horrors of war and the benefits of peace 
that war eliminates. It does not claim that everyone is warlike because everyone is 
greedy or vainglorious. It says that people have a variety of psychological 
characteristics and that the moderate and self-disciplined can be drawn into war by the 
threat to life posed by the greedy and vainglorious, by natural scarcity, and by the fact 
that everyone is naturally their own judge of what means and ends to adopt for safety 
and prosperity. 
 
Parts One and Two of Leviathan up to a point recapitulate The Elements of Law. In 
both books there is an anatomization of human nature into volitional, cognitive and 
linguistic capacities, and an argument identifying some elements of human nature as 
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ingredients of war. Chapter 14 of The Elements of Law corresponds in this respect to 
Chapter 13 of Leviathan. In place of the ‘extremely famous passage’ in Leviathan 
about the incommodities of war and the life of man ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short’, The Elements of Law contains the following: 
 
The estate of hostility and war being such, as thereby nature itself is destroyed 
and men kill one another (as we know also that it is, both by the experience of 
savage nations that live at this day, and by the histories of our ancestors, the 
old inhabitants of Germany and other now civil countries, where we find the 
people few and short lived, and without the ornaments and comforts of life, 
which by peace and society are usually invented and procured): he therefore 
that desireth to live in such an estate, as is the estate of liberty and right of all 
to all, contradicteth himself. For every man by natural necessity desireth his 
own good, to which this estate is contrary (Hobbes 1994: Ch. 14 s.12, p. 80). 
 
Here the irrationality of wanting to be in the state of war, rather than the extreme 
fearfulness of being at war, is supposed to establish the desirability of peace or 
submission. By contrast, the famous passage from Leviathan is much more powerful 
rhetorically without being any the less the conclusion of a scientific argument. Again, 
The Elements of Law was composed before there were home-grown experiences of 
out and out war. It has to settle for allusion to histories and accounts of travellers and 
traders returning from North America. 
 
 
 
V 
 
 
I have been trying to reconcile Hobbes’s hostility to appeals to experience in science 
with his developing a science of politics in which he appeals to experience. The key 
to the reconciliation is the fact that the science of politics was from the start conceived 
as a persuasive science, that is, as a science intended to be addressed to citizens with a 
tendency to resist and resent the demands of government. There is no tension between 
 20 
persuasion and various kinds of appeal to experience, including appeals to experience 
intended to make certain sates of affairs hopeful or fearful.  
 
Hobbes also described the science of politics as an inference to the generation of a 
certain kind of artefact. He conceived the body politic as an artefact composed of its 
makers and kept together by a continuing act of submission for the purpose of 
individual security. The artefact could be understood scientifically as the product of 
following rules, starting with the foundational rule of making peace by laying down 
rights. The role of a science of politics was not only to reconstruct the powers of 
government and the duties of subjects as fulfilments of these rules. It was also to 
produce, for readers of his book, motivation to obey (if a reader was a subject) or 
govern (if the reader was a sovereign) according to the rules. In each case nothing less 
than survival hangs on following the rules. Certain kinds of appeal to experience 
make what is at stake vivid, and this is not incidental to a persuasive civil science.  
 
The appeals to experience in Hobbes’s civil science are not the only things that close 
the distance between him and experimental philosophers. There is also the fact that 
the science of the commonwealth is bound up with acting on the matter of the 
commonwealth. What makes for the integrity of the commonwealth is not only the 
uniformity of submission and its being directed at a single sovereign through 
compliance with his rules: it is also the continuity of submission in the face of the 
inconveniences of government, and keeping in mind that government does no less 
than secure one’s life. The persuasive character of Hobbes’s civil science counteracts 
the impressions of inconvenience and directly maintains the commonwealth–it does 
not just cater for our wish to know, for all bodies, what the causes of their properties 
are. 
 
In natural philosophy Hobbes was much less wedded to acting on kinds of matter 
under investigation. For example, Dialogus Physicus is an exercise in countering a 
host of hypotheses invoked by Boyle to explain a wide variety of effects associated 
with an air-pump and valved, spherical receptacles. To the suggestion from Boyle that 
air pumped out of a sealed container created a vacuum, or that mercury in a glass tube 
apparently empty at the top could be made  to rise by the addition of mercury to a dish 
at its base, Hobbes offered redescriptions of the phenomena consistent with the 
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hypothesis of a plenum. Pumping did not really evacuate a sphere, for example, and 
many effects with the air pump were conceivably the products of simple circular 
motion, the kind of motion that returns a body and its parts to their original position. 
 
The disagreement with Boyle has sources in both Hobbes’s philosophy of science and 
in his politics. First, according to Hobbes, natural phenomena underdetermined their 
explanations: as he says at the very end of De corpore (Hobbes 1845: Vol I: 531 & 
Vol VII: 3), more than one cause can be assigned to virtually any observed effect. 
This makes physics less certain than geometry, less certain even than civil science. In 
the latter cases, human beings produce the effects – geometrical figures and bodies 
politic and actually endow those objects with their properties. The only person to have 
maker’s knowledge of natural effects, on the other hand, is God. Everyone else, the 
human physicist included, has to infer causes that are consistent with and more 
general than the effects, and rival causes can be assigned, as the Dialogus Physicus 
illustrates. 
 
It might be thought that effects produced under relatively controlled conditions with 
relatively simple experimental equipment are also open to a kind of maker’s 
knowledge. Does not the operator of the equipment produce and so have maker’s 
knowledge of e.g. the causes of rises and falls of liquids in tubes after pumping 
actions? But this is what Hobbes denies. The equipment is made up of materials 
whose effects both separately and when combined themselves require physical 
explanation. For example, if conceivably there is no genuinely air-tight apparatus, 
because the materials allow for the penetration of minute particles, then the use of the 
terms ‘empty’, ‘vacuum’, ‘evacuated’, ‘fluid’, ‘heavy’, and ‘suffocation’ to describe 
the phenomena can be question-begging. 
 
The connection between Dialogus Physicus and politics lies in the practice of expert 
witnessing of experiments by members of ‘academies’. Hobbes contrasts the audience 
for Boyle’s experiments with the ‘academy’ he had known in Paris, and whose 
impresario was Marin Mersenne (Hobbes 1985: 351). In the Parisian academy, as 
Hobbes describes it, discoveries could be explained to a critical but open-minded 
audience. In the case of Boyle and the Royal Society, on the other hand, animus 
toward investigators could be based on extra-scientific considerations or on small-
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mindedness. In the Epistle Dedicatory of Dialogus Physicus to Sorbière (Hobbes 
1985: 347-8), Hobbes reports that a mathematical demonstration of his that he himself 
had discovered was mistaken was ceremoniously ‘refuted' by people in the circle 
around Boyle, even though Hobbes was no longer putting it forward. He complains 
further that many or all in the Royal Society are his enemies (Hobbes 1985: 347). 
 
Later, in the actual text of Dialogus Physicus, after Hobbes’s mouthpiece, A, has 
proposed that the structure of air should be modelled on the structure of compressed 
wool, he uses the hypothesis of the simple circular motion to explain how wool 
regains its shape after compression.  
 
A. Thus, the parts of each aerial corpuscle were moved apart by returning into 
themselves with that motion, before which that corpuscle would have been 
made up of those smaller ones 
B. It cannot be made otherwise 
A. Do not your Fellows also think so?  
B. Perhaps one or another, but not the rest 
A. I believe you. For this motion of restitution comes from Hobbes, and is first 
and solely explained by him in the book De corpore, chap. 21, art. 8. Without 
which hypothesis, however much work, method or cost be expended on 
finding the invisible causes of natural things, it would be in vain. You now see 
that this spring of the air that they suppose is either impossible or they must 
have recourse to the Hobbesian hypothesis, which because perhaps they have 
not understood, they have rejected (Hobbes 1985: 358) 
 
The strong implication of this and other passages is that the hypothesis was rejected 
because Hobbes had proposed it, rather than on account of evidence of its being 
defective. Here was common or garden prejudice or perhaps political disagreement 
translating itself into scientific disagreement or even ostracism. To the extent that 
experimental philosophy involved an ‘academy’, and to the extent that the activities 
of an academy could be the conscious or even unwitting expression of enmity, it was 
an instrument of controversy and conflict. The Parisian ‘academy’ was something 
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else: a society for hearing ‘demonstrations’ often worked out in private following a 
method that excluded controversy (Sorell 1986: 43-54).  
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Notes 
 
 
1 He was dismissive of ‘chymists and mechanics’ and the work that had fed manuals, 
almanacs and natural histories. See (Sorell 1986: 5). 
2 All references to Leviathan are to the Tuck edition (Hobbes 1991). 
3 Bacon’s Historia naturalis et experimentalis speaks similarly of natural history as 
providing ‘the right timber and material’ for the Organum (i.e. for natural 
philosophy).  See (Bacon 1996: 13). I am grateful to Alberto Vanzo for this reference. 
4 References are by volume and page number of the Molesworth edition of Hobbes’s 
English Works (Hobbes 1845).  
5 Or perhaps the acquisition of kingship. On the bearing of arguments in Leviathan on 
decisions that had to be made by Charles II on how to re-assert sovereignty with the 
co-operation of the Scots, see Noel Malcolm’s Introduction to the critical edition of 
Leviathan (Hobbes 2013: Vol 3: 25-35). In general, Malcolm agrees that Leviathan 
was intended to be read specifically by Charles II (Hobbes 2013: Vol 3: 51), and that, 
although the composition of the book was already in progress before that, events in 
1649 made certain arguments in it particularly timely, notably those about the 
impossibility of granting powers essential to sovereignty identified in chapter 29.  
6 It is a delicate question whether Grotius disputed the definition before Hobbes. In 
the Prologue to The Law of War and Peace, Grotius claims that human beings are 
sociable, but in an importantly unAristotelian style. Sociability in Grotius’s sense is 
voluntary and up to a point artificial, not natural; it also co-exists with natural mutual 
fear and the latent threat of violence (Grotius 2013). Richard Tuck has insisted that 
Hobbes is indebted to Grotius. See (Tuck 1998; 1983; 1982; 1987). Tuck’s 
interpretation associates Hobbes with what he calls “post-scepticism”, an 
interpretation I have strongly rejected previously (Sorell 1993). 
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7 The widespread damage and dislocation associated with the war is described by 
Stephen Porter in The Blast of War (Porter 2011). 
 
 
